Computers are literally counting machines, they can take out human error out of the vote counting process and can provider a better user experience and general usability specially with citizens with special needs.
Many of you are anti e-voting, but this seems reactionary. Just because we have an incompetent company out there implementing a version of e-voting machines, doesn't mean we can't come up with a solid, open and tamper proof solution.
Several open source projects have been started around this idea, and all that is needed is people to support these efforts and encourage government to sponsor one of these projects/consortia.
http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/
For example, the system proposed by the Open Voting Consortium still contains a trail of paper ballots that can be used to verify the vote count manually if necessary. It basically makes the computer terminal an input method (like your pen) and the scanner is the physical link to the actual count (I think this could be done without the need for scans personally).
In my view, a proper e-voting machine would fit this criteria:
1) Be completely open source based: That includes the actual voting software, the operating system and even the hardware. The hardware is a bit of overkill, but at least the hardware specification and certification can be treated as an open standard. On the extreme side, you could mandate something like what Sun Microsystems has done with open sourcing some of their hardware (but again, that might be too much).
2) Paper trail. Any system would require to still print out paper ballots. This provides a physical method for double checking results, and can also be used as a way for the voter to review their votes. You use the machine, print out the result check it and submit it to the scanner (or skip the scan step for other systems).
3) Randomize the order of candidates. I don't think there's a "fair" way to place the order of the candidates and to me the only acceptable method is to randomize this. Should this matter? No. Does it matter? Yes.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/04/op...4krosnick.html
4) The voting system should support multiple languages and the latest accessibility methods.
And on (1), the project should be an independent organization, like the Apache foundation, or OSGi, but should be backed and funded by the government. Private contributions could raise concerns about corporations and other groups trying to influence the system.
I proposed a "voting receipt" idea, but some concerns were raised about it violating the concept of a "secret ballot". I'll say I agree with that and say that the paper trail already suggested in these systems is good enough for this.
Many of you are anti e-voting, but this seems reactionary. Just because we have an incompetent company out there implementing a version of e-voting machines, doesn't mean we can't come up with a solid, open and tamper proof solution.
Several open source projects have been started around this idea, and all that is needed is people to support these efforts and encourage government to sponsor one of these projects/consortia.
http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/
For example, the system proposed by the Open Voting Consortium still contains a trail of paper ballots that can be used to verify the vote count manually if necessary. It basically makes the computer terminal an input method (like your pen) and the scanner is the physical link to the actual count (I think this could be done without the need for scans personally).
In my view, a proper e-voting machine would fit this criteria:
1) Be completely open source based: That includes the actual voting software, the operating system and even the hardware. The hardware is a bit of overkill, but at least the hardware specification and certification can be treated as an open standard. On the extreme side, you could mandate something like what Sun Microsystems has done with open sourcing some of their hardware (but again, that might be too much).
2) Paper trail. Any system would require to still print out paper ballots. This provides a physical method for double checking results, and can also be used as a way for the voter to review their votes. You use the machine, print out the result check it and submit it to the scanner (or skip the scan step for other systems).
3) Randomize the order of candidates. I don't think there's a "fair" way to place the order of the candidates and to me the only acceptable method is to randomize this. Should this matter? No. Does it matter? Yes.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/04/op...4krosnick.html
Quote:
| Candidates listed first on the ballot get about two percentage points more votes on average than they would have if they had been listed later (flipping a 49 to 51 defeat into a 51 to 49 victory). In fact, in about half the races I have studied, the advantage of first place is even bigger — certainly big enough to win some elections these days. |
And on (1), the project should be an independent organization, like the Apache foundation, or OSGi, but should be backed and funded by the government. Private contributions could raise concerns about corporations and other groups trying to influence the system.
I proposed a "voting receipt" idea, but some concerns were raised about it violating the concept of a "secret ballot". I'll say I agree with that and say that the paper trail already suggested in these systems is good enough for this.
