<not been in here for a long time>
Anyhoo, I posted this in the book forum. As there's obviously some crossover I thought I should post it here. Perhaps it will spark some debate.
Just finished Al-Qaeda by Jason Burke of The Observer (UK). A forensic analysis of the beginnings of the group, the motivations of the main Salafist players, the role of Bin Laden in Afghanistan, the relationship between al-Qaeda and the people of Afghanistan, the transformation of AQ during “The War on Terror” as well as the hopeless myths ascribed to it by Western governments:Burke is one of the new breed of Robert Fisk-inspired journalists who has no problems roughing it with the indigenous population for as long as it takes to get a story. He speaks fluent Arabic and is remarkably well informed for such a young guy.
Some of the main points:
1. In order to gain international recognition the Taliban (“a local movement with limited knowledge of the outside world, Islamic or otherwise, and profoundly parochial ambitions”) agreed to outlaw all opium production in Afghanistan (verified). Following the legislation supply dropped to a record low and the price of opium shot through the roof. The West thought it was a gimmick and ignored their request.
2. After the arrival of Bin Laden in Afghanistan the Taliban became extremely uneasy. They felt he was bringing too much heat down on them from the international community. Mullah Omar had little time for OBL's internationalist Jihad movement and instructed him to stay out of Afghanistan's affairs.
3. The relationship between the Taliban and bin Laden dissolved to the point where they agreed to hand him, Ayman-al-Zawahiri, Mohammed Atef and the rest of Al-Qaeda over to America via Saudi Arabia (verified).
4. The deal fell apart when Clinton decided to distract attention away from his extra-marital affairs by launching cruise missiles into Afghanistan & Pakistan. Following these strikes the Taliban walked away from the table. They refused to hand AQ over because they would have lost face with their Pakistani paymasters.
5. Bin Laden was probably responsible for the car-bombing of former ally and the West's preferred moderate choice as president – Abdul Azzam.
6. Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi the Jordanian-born militant and (according to the West) Al-Qaeda operative responsible for a wave of brutal murders in Iraq before being killed in a US airstrike positioned himself as a rival to OBL rather than a follower.
7. The al-Qaeda hardcore (perhaps no larger than 200 individuals) has been massively degraded by the activities of Western armed forces in Afghanistan and Pakistani operations in the north of their country.
Burke's point is that al-Qaeda has moved from being a centralised operation training and funding terrorist activities abroad to an amorphous and thus extremely difficult (and far more dangerous) target to gather intelligence on. The new breed of al-Qaeda terrorists are often born in the country they choose to attack and may have little or no connection with the group whose ideals they wear on their chest. Which is precisely what bin Laden planned to achieve in the first place.
Anyhoo, I posted this in the book forum. As there's obviously some crossover I thought I should post it here. Perhaps it will spark some debate.
Just finished Al-Qaeda by Jason Burke of The Observer (UK). A forensic analysis of the beginnings of the group, the motivations of the main Salafist players, the role of Bin Laden in Afghanistan, the relationship between al-Qaeda and the people of Afghanistan, the transformation of AQ during “The War on Terror” as well as the hopeless myths ascribed to it by Western governments:Burke is one of the new breed of Robert Fisk-inspired journalists who has no problems roughing it with the indigenous population for as long as it takes to get a story. He speaks fluent Arabic and is remarkably well informed for such a young guy.
Some of the main points:
1. In order to gain international recognition the Taliban (“a local movement with limited knowledge of the outside world, Islamic or otherwise, and profoundly parochial ambitions”) agreed to outlaw all opium production in Afghanistan (verified). Following the legislation supply dropped to a record low and the price of opium shot through the roof. The West thought it was a gimmick and ignored their request.
2. After the arrival of Bin Laden in Afghanistan the Taliban became extremely uneasy. They felt he was bringing too much heat down on them from the international community. Mullah Omar had little time for OBL's internationalist Jihad movement and instructed him to stay out of Afghanistan's affairs.
3. The relationship between the Taliban and bin Laden dissolved to the point where they agreed to hand him, Ayman-al-Zawahiri, Mohammed Atef and the rest of Al-Qaeda over to America via Saudi Arabia (verified).
4. The deal fell apart when Clinton decided to distract attention away from his extra-marital affairs by launching cruise missiles into Afghanistan & Pakistan. Following these strikes the Taliban walked away from the table. They refused to hand AQ over because they would have lost face with their Pakistani paymasters.
5. Bin Laden was probably responsible for the car-bombing of former ally and the West's preferred moderate choice as president – Abdul Azzam.
6. Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi the Jordanian-born militant and (according to the West) Al-Qaeda operative responsible for a wave of brutal murders in Iraq before being killed in a US airstrike positioned himself as a rival to OBL rather than a follower.
7. The al-Qaeda hardcore (perhaps no larger than 200 individuals) has been massively degraded by the activities of Western armed forces in Afghanistan and Pakistani operations in the north of their country.
Quote:
| “At the beginning of this book I outlined the various meanings of al-Qaeda. It could mean a vanguard, a base or a maxim, precept, rule or methodology. In the fifteen years since the end of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan modern Islamic militancy has run through three phases, each of which corresponds to one of those meanings. In the first phase, from around 1989 to 1996, hundreds of activists who had been involved in the war against the Soviets or were fighting local struggles against regimes in the Middle East worked, often independently, at radicalising and mobilising those who had hitherto shunned extremism. These activists saw themselves as 'the vanguard' – 'al-Qaeda al'sulbah' – and saw their role as enlightening and then leading the masses into war and a just society. Their preferred propaganda weapon was spectacular violence. From 1996-2001 much of this 'vanguard' came together in Afghanistan, where an unprecedented terrorist infrastructure was available. Though many remained independent, a large number became associated with bin Laden, who by the autumn of 1998 had the highest profile of all the alumni of the war against the Soviets. Using that profile, and helped by historical circumstances that pushed the Taliban closer to the foreign Jihadis, bin Laden was able to create something that approximated 'a base', the second understanding of al-Qaeda that I mentioned in my first chapter. Then came 11 September and the subsequent campaign which destroyed that 'base'. The second phase came to an end. We are now in the third phase, where al-Qaeda, neither a vanguard or a base, is instead accurately characterised by the third translation I outlined: the methodology, the maxim, the precept, the rule, the way of seeing the world. You are a member of 'al-Qaeda' if you say you are”. |
