Quote:
Originally Posted by stelios 
US involvement in Afghanistan is a really sad story. It wasn't really on the map until the Soviets became interested in it. So then the US started started training and pumping money into the Mujahideen in order to lure the Soviets into a prolonged guerilla war. One of their more prominent leaders was Commander Ahmad Shah Massud a well educated moderate Afghani and he was seen as the West's big hope for a stable Afghanistan. Keep in mind that the Mujahideen where a very loose coalition (putting it mildly) and as prone to go after each other once the Soviets were out. Sadly post war Afghanistan was dropped like a hot piece of coal prompting Massud to make several appeals to the West. Basically saying that the situation was getting out of control and that the drug traffickers and the religious extremists were taking over. He was of course ignored. The story ended with him and other moderates getting either killed of chased out of the country and the Taleban taking over.
|
Massoud
was regarded by the West as a moderate, but he remained broadly a supporter of political Islamism (recognising Allah's primacy over any other mechanism or institution) all his life.
Massoud was an interesting character. He arrived in Peshawar around 1979 as one of the first Jihadis (almost all of which were affluent graduates hailing from outside of Afghanistan) and worked alongside Burhanuddin Rabbani (a Tajik university professor who translated the writings of Qutb), Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a bloodthirsty lunatic Pashtun nationalist who used both the religious hard-liners and the Pakistani SIS to gain as much power as possible) and a number of Deobandi militants to establish Islamist headquarters. Initially there were very few of them. Most of the freedom fighters in the medresses were born in Afghanistan and couldn't care less about a global Islamic cause. But Massoud and company had access to money. Tons of it. Wealthy Saudi Islamists, buoyed by their Shia cousins' success in routing the Shah and establishing the world's first Islamic state, decided to invest in a Sunni alternative. The Afghan rebels - whilst viewing the hard-line ideology with disdain - were only too pleased to accept the Islamists' money and used it to finance their guerrilla campaign. This was before the CIA started channelling money into Pakistan in 1980 (roughly the same time bin Laden arrived in Peshawar). Pretty soon the Islamists had all the men they needed and Massoud went on to become one of the biggest thorns in the side of the Russian occupation.
The CIA's BIG hope was Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. Initially he courted bin Laden for his money, but ultimately lost out to Ayman al-Zawahiri* (bin Laden's second in command today and the religious "authority" behind al Qaeda). As the years crept by the rift between Azzam and the Wahhabite radicals widened (his moderate views and considerable support among Afghans were a considerable threat). In 1989 he died in a car bombing. The identity of the killer(s) remains a mystery but many believe bin Laden had some involvement.
As for the initial question about a "just war" - as ethereal ideas go "Bring democracy to Afghanistan" is one of the most. Even if you accept that there can be such a thing as a just war - it would have to be based on precise and unequivocal objectives. Whilst the establishment of democracy seems pretty clear cut - the underlying minutiae (essential lest you end up without an exit strategy) are vapour thin. In an
ideal environment you wouldn't entertain the question very long. In a politically, socially, ethnically and religiously complex country as Afghanistan you'd be forgiven for thinking it ironic.
Another key issue when you're talking about just war is
proportionality: The balance between the desired end and the likely consequences of getting there. Military action must be expected to do more good than harm. The "good" - certainly for Bush - was ensuring Afghanistan could no longer be considered safe haven for Islamic radicals and granting "freedom" to the people and - perhaps - providing a safe environment for the pipeline the oil companies have clamoured for for years. But the "bad" could only ever be bad on a sliding scale between "very" and "extremely".
At this moment there are American, British and various other coalition forces' service personnel in Afghanistan, a substantial proportion of which I'm willing to bet (on the strength of conversations I've had with friends who've toured there) , can't tell you why they are there. Given that Bush said it could take ten or more years for the "plan" to be realised, the potential for another Vietnam is staring us in the face. That said, Vietnam was a far less complicated conundrum than the one before us.
Yes, the Afghans have tolerated manipulation by foreign powers such as America, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia - but only because they were getting something out of the deal (the misguided notion of Independence). But step into their country whilst bearing arms and they will fight to the last breath. Over a hundred years ago Kipling (who knew a thing or two about the folly of pursuing ethereal ideas abroad) wrote:
Quote:
When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains,
and the women come out to cut up what remains,
jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains
and go to your gawd like a soldier. |
The significance for the soldiers of today is as chilling as it was for the British back then.
* Ayman al-Zawahiri wasn't born a radical Islamist as some might have us believe. As a young man in the seventies he was committed to the peaceful pursuit of a free Egypt, which was held in the vice-like grip of another stooge (first Russian, then American) – Anwar Sadat. When Sadat chose to alienate himself from the entire Islamic world by signing a peace deal with Israel (bought by the CIA) he angered the Egyptian Islamists in his own country (moderate and radical) too. They felt they had been betrayed. In 1981 Sadat was assassinated and al-Zawahiri - who was not involved – as well as hundreds of other political Islamists were rounded up, found guilty of spurious charges and thrown into prison where they - like Sayyed Qutb a decade earlier - were tortured using methods the CIA approved. In Afghanistan he provided the ideological authority for the radical Islamists. Middle East experts have long theorised the possibility that al-Zawahiri wooed bin Laden away from Azzam with the chance to become leader of his own faction (the proto-al Qaeda). In truth neither could function without the other. bin Laden had the money but no religious authority whereas Zawahiri had little money but did have extensive expertise in Koranic study and was a powerful writer and orator.