The Military, or When A Repairman Says "Two Weeks," It Usually Isn't

That's true from a certain perspective, but I think it's perfectly reasonable to expect your General types to be able to assess the political situation. One does not rise to a leadership position in any significantly complex organization without some degree of political savy in addition to competency at the actual job at hand.

Also, there has long been a tie between the political and the military, typically the latter making the stability of the former possible. Our own country has been no exception throughout it's history. It's logical, in general, to expect the military to achieve a level of stability before a new government can transition into power.

The situation in Iraq, however, is fucked up for oodles of reasons. I'd say first and foremost, why is it OUR military attempting to do the stabilizing?

I was under the impression that it wasn't really the soldiers that wanted this war to go on.

Certainly no sane soldier would want a war to continue.

No sane soldier does. And most soldiers are sane. They do want to believe they are making a difference, that their war has a moral (or at least beneficial) purpose. They want to accomplish the mission. The problem for them is the administration has no clear success metric for them to achieve.

Alan is mostly correct, except that the military (especially there) knows better than the politicians. But that doesn't mean *he* knows or should be making decisions. The civilian control of the government should establish the overall goals (with some input from the military, but primarily from State Department or Foreign Policy experts), and the military should then be allowed to prosecute the conflict (which is their specialty). Each to their own expertise. I do believe there should be open lines of communication (there are rules the military must obey, and limitations the civilians must understand).

I think a huge burden has been placed on our military in this war. Far more than the standard (yet hugely challenging) tactical challenges of fighting in hostile territory. They are being asked to do what the administration is incapable of doing on the ground. It's ridiculous. You can't look at the big picture while searching for IEDs or dodging bullets.

A point being overlooked is that most if not all high level officers are in fact politicians. It's a political appointment to become a General and it takes a political savy person to make it that far. The days of the rank and file making it to the top are long gone. Now days you have mostly a bunch of college and academy grads who've been in since the late 70's calling the shots.

And Chris is right no sane soldier would want the war to go on. It's not like they get paid by the number of bodies they rack up. But also there's a certain culture in the military that makes the troops feel like losers whenever people start talking about pulling out early.

Word. I can't even count how many times I used to get ostracized for speaking out against the war only to have my guys come to me later to discuss how they feel the same way I do. And this was back when we were just in Afghanistan. I know it's the same bullshit because the guys I still talk to only admit to being terrified of dying and exhausted with fighting when they are stateside and away from their unit. It's the 800lb. gorilla in the room that everyone is ignoring.

I always got a Captain Sobel feeling from all the CO's I had to serve under.

Army and Navy officer candidates learn different core legends (both of which happen to be true) that speak to Alan's wife's point.

Army cadets learn about General McClellan. From Wikipedia:
George Brinton McClellan (December 3, 1826 – October 29, 1885) was a major general during the American Civil War. He organized the famous Army of the Potomac and served briefly (November 1861 to March 1862) as the general-in-chief of the Union Army. Early in the war, McClellan played an important role in raising a well-trained and organized army for the Union. However, although McClellan was meticulous in his planning and preparations, these attributes may have hampered his ability to challenge aggressive opponents in a fast-moving battlefield environment. He chronically overestimated the strength of enemy units and was reluctant to apply principles of mass, frequently leaving large portions of his army unengaged at decisive points.
McClellan's Peninsula Campaign in 1862 ended in failure, retreating from attacks by General Robert E. Lee's smaller army, failing in the planned seizure of the Confederate capital of Richmond. His performance at the bloody Battle of Antietam blunted Lee's invasion of Maryland, but allowed Lee to eke out a precarious tactical draw and avoid destruction, despite being outnumbered. As a result, McClellan's leadership skills during battles were questioned by U.S. President Abraham Lincoln, who eventually removed him from command, first as general-in-chief, then from the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln was famously quoted as saying, "If General McClellan does not want to use the army, I would like to borrow it for a time." Despite this, he was the most popular of that army's commanders with its soldiers, who felt that he had their morale and well-being as paramount concerns.

In Army lore, the man was an abject failure who put the needs of his men above the needs of the nation. Lincoln replaced him with U.S. Grant, who turned the handle on meat grinder, but won the war.

Navy midshipmen learn about the Message to Garcia. Here's an excerpt:

In all this Cuban business there is one man stands out on the horizon of my memory like Mars at perihelion. When war broke out between Spain & the United States, it was very necessary to communicate quickly with the leader of the Insurgents. Garcia was somewhere in the mountain vastness of Cuba- no one knew where. No mail nor telegraph message could reach him. The President must secure his cooperation, and quickly.

What to do!

Some one said to the President, "There’s a fellow by the name of Rowan will find Garcia for you, if anybody can."

Rowan was sent for and given a letter to be delivered to Garcia. How "the fellow by the name of Rowan" took the letter, sealed it up in an oil-skin pouch, strapped it over his heart, in four days landed by night off the coast of Cuba from an open boat, disappeared into the jungle, & in three weeks came out on the other side of the Island, having traversed a hostile country on foot, and delivered his letter to Garcia, are things I have no special desire now to tell in detail.

The point I wish to make is this: McKinley gave Rowan a letter to be delivered to Garcia; Rowan took the letter and did not ask, "Where is he at?" By the Eternal! there is a man whose form should be cast in deathless bronze and the statue placed in every college of the land. It is not book-learning young men need, nor instruction about this and that, but a stiffening of the vertebrae which will cause them to be loyal to a trust, to act promptly, concentrate their energies: do the thing- "Carry a message to Garcia!"
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Military officers learn grand strategy, for one of the jobs of the military executive is to advise cicilian politicians on courses of action. They learn that later, however (and politicians often ignore or specifically refuse to speak with senior officers). What they learn first is the lesson of these stories: when duly constituted authority says "Go," complaints and excuses don't cut it: execute the mission.

Successful flag and general officers are people with long track records of executing difficult missions. Everything about their institutional training and personal experience tells them they are "can-do" people: they're Grants and Rowans and, for as long as they wear the uniform, they are not going to be the guy who says, "But, Mr. President, it's too hard!"